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BOOK REVIEWS
A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good, by Robert Adams. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006. 256 pages. $35 (paperback).
THOMAS L. CARSON, Loyola University Chicago
Adams proposes a theory of virtue, or a theory about what it is to be a 
morally good person—he uses the term “virtue” to refer to good moral 
character and good traits of character. He contrasts his theory with what he 
calls “virtue ethics.” Virtue ethics holds that “a theory of virtue provides 
the right foundation for all of ethics, and that the ethics of duty should 
be reduced to, or replaced by, the ethics of virtue” (6). Adams offers brief 
but forceful arguments against defining right and wrong actions in terms 
of what a virtuous person would do. The book consists of three parts. In 
part I, Adams states his theory of virtue. Part II discusses the relationship 
between self and others. Part III addresses recent findings in social psy-
chology, which according to some, show “that there really are no virtues 
and vices, and indeed no traits of character” (12).
Adams defines moral virtue as “persisting excellence in being for the 
good” (14). Being virtuous involves being for the good and against the 
bad. According to Adams, 
There are many ways of being for something. They include: loving it, liking 
it, respecting it, wanting it, wishing for it, appreciating it, thinking highly of 
it, speaking in favor of it, and otherwise intentionally standing for it symbol-
ically, acting to promote or protect it, and being disposed to do such things. 
(15–16)
Adams holds that there are a wide variety of goods that virtue can be for. 
Virtue can be for the good/welfare of others and oneself; it can also be for 
intellectual and aesthetic values.
Virtue involves being for the good, but:
Not every way of being for something good is virtuous or a virtue. One 
can seek goods selfishly, only for oneself; or unjustly, only for one’s friends, 
without regard for the rights of strangers. . . . What distinguishes virtuous 
ways of being for something from other ways? The criterion I propose is that 
virtuous ways of being for the good must be excellent. (23–24)
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Adams does not provide criteria for determining presence or absence of 
the kind of excellence in question. “The grounds for judgments of excel-
lence of ways of being for the good are too varied, and often too subtle, 
I believe, for any algorithmic treatment” (26). Nonetheless, Adams has a 
theory about the nature of excellence—things are excellent to the extent 
that they resemble God. He defends this view in Finite and Infinite Goods 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) and reaffirms it in the present 
book. Some readers of this journal will be disappointed that he says very 
little about his divine resemblance theory of excellence and good and bad 
and his divine command theory of right and wrong in the present book.1
As Adams notes, his theory about the nature of virtue is very similar 
to the theory Thomas Hurka defends in his book Virtue, Vice, and Value 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Very roughly, Hurka holds that 
virtue consists in loving goods and hating evils. Unlike Adams, Hurka 
proposes a formula for determining whether or not a person’s attitude 
about something is virtuous. According to Hurka, love/hate for something 
is virtuous to the extent that it is proportional to the goodness/badness of 
the thing in question. This view seems to imply that having special con-
cern for one’s own friends and family and for one’s own projects and en-
deavors is contrary to virtue, since it is false that our own personal friends 
and family have much greater intrinsic value than other people (and it 
is false that our own endeavors have greater value than other people’s). 
Hurka attempts to answer this objection by claiming that there are “agent-
relative values, ones that are good or evil only or to a greater degree from 
some people’s points of view than from others” (Hurka, 199; quoted by 
Adams on 27). But Adams argues that Hurka’s theory commits him to an 
indefensible view about what things are intrinsically valuable.
Hurka makes clear that the values he is talking about in this context are 
. . . “intrinsic” values. By one thing’s being better than another from some 
person’s point of view he does not mean just that the person subjectively 
values the former more than the latter. But while it is quite appropriate, and 
normally virtuous, to care more intensely about a life partner’s health than 
about most other people’s, it would be repulsively self-centered to think that 
one’s partner’s health is intrinsically more important than other people’s. (27)
Another attempt to formulate a standard for ascriptions of virtue is Julia 
Driver’s “trait consequentialism” which holds roughly that virtues are 
1There are serious problems involved in basing a theory of human virtue on resemblance 
to God. Many of the moral virtues, such as courage and self-control, essentially involve hu-
man limitations. It seems untenable to hold that excellence in these matters ultimately con-
sists in resembling a perfect God who is not subject to human fears, and vulnerabilities, and 
appetites. The Christian doctrine of the incarnation may afford Adams an answer to these 
problems. Adams could say that we are virtuous to the extent that our relevant attitudes, 
emotions, actions, and dispositions resemble those of God in the human person of Christ. 
For a very detailed development of this view, see Linda Zagzebski’s Divine Motivation Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Adams doesn’t talk about the idea of the 
imitation of Christ in the present book, but see his review of Zagzebski in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 73 (2006): 493–497.
BOOK REVIEWS 349
traits of character that produce good effects. Adams offers several criti-
cisms of her view. Imagine people who are such that beating one’s child 
when s/he is exactly 5.57 years old greatly increases the life expectancy 
of the child. Some of these people have an intense desire to beat children 
when they are exactly 5.57 years old and take intense pleasure in doing 
so. Driver regards this special trait as a virtue. Adams finds this extremely 
counterintuitive. He also thinks it very counterintuitive that Driver would 
have to count competitiveness as a virtue if it is generally a beneficial trait, 
as defenders of capitalism have sometimes claimed. Adams argues:
Competitiveness, as normally understood, involves hostility to the interests 
of other people (a hostility limited to certain contexts, to be sure). That can 
hardly be a virtue, even if it has good consequences. (56)
Adams categorizes different kinds of virtues:
Some virtues are defined by motives which in turn are defined by goods 
that one is for in having them, as benevolence, for example, is defined by the 
motive of desiring or willing the good of others. We may call these motiva-
tional virtues. . . . Other virtues—courage, for example, and also self-control 
and patience—are not defined in that way, by particular motives or by one’s 
aims, but are rather structural features of the way one organizes and man-
ages whatever motives one has. (33)
Some virtues such as practical wisdom do not fit neatly into either cate-
gory and certain kinds of physical and psychological strengths, e.g., good 
memory and physical vigor, can enhance one’s virtues, although they are 
not virtues themselves.
Adams defines a vice as “a trait of character that is bad in such a way 
that if you have it, that counts (not necessarily decisively) against your 
having a good moral character” (36). His classification of vices is most 
illuminating. Vices of weakness, such as cowardice and incontinence, are 
structural vices and are not defined by goods and bads that they are for 
or against. Vices of excess, for example, avarice, sensuality, workaholism, 
and chauvinism, involve being too much for certain goods. The vices of 
self preference consist in excessive concern for one’s own good. The vice 
of ruthlessness consists in excessive willingness to sacrifice the good of 
others. Motivational vices corresponding to motivational virtues are vices 
of opposition or indifference to the good. Chief among these vices are mal-
ice, cruelty, envy, vindictiveness, and Schadenfreude. “No vice seems more 
appalling to me than cruelty. It attacks great goods of personal life—its en-
joyment and sometimes its persistence and even its meaning—and takes 
satisfaction in doing so” (41). Adams qualifies this statement; he thinks 
that desiring that others be punished because one thinks that they deserve 
to be punished is compatible with being virtuous. Desiring retributive 
punishment can be construed as a case of being for the good—one might 
desire that someone be punished to remove the evil of his “having gotten 
away with” an unjust act.
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The second part of the book asks whether moral goodness is good for 
those who are morally good. Does moral goodness enhance the welfare 
of those who are morally good? Adams has much to say about this ques-
tion. Plato and the Stoics contend that being morally virtuous is both nec-
essary and sufficient for flourishing. Aristotle holds that moral excellence 
is an important and necessary constituent of human welfare but rejects the 
view that it is sufficient for personal welfare. Many modern philosophers 
think that it is possible for morally bad people to flourish, and Nietzsche 
holds that some of the virtues lauded by Christian morality are harmful 
to their possessors. Adams holds that moral virtues are intrinsically good 
and at least partly constitutive our well being. He says that “virtue is not a 
sufficient condition of well-being for its possessors, but . . . it is a necessary 
condition of the best sort of happiness or well-being” (61).
Adams defines altruism as other-regarding benevolence: “It signifies 
any motive that takes as its end or goal the good or well-being of one 
or more persons other than oneself” (65). Altruism has enormous instru-
mental value. According to Adams, altruism is also intrinsically valuable. 
It is reasonable for me, not only to desire the good of other people, but to 
desire that I help promote their good. Loving parents can desire that their 
children be altruistic and want them to be prepared to act altruistically, 
even when doing so is contrary to the children’s self-interest.
[A] person’s good or well-being is not the only thing one can want or favor 
or support for that person’s sake. In many cases, if you have asked me to do 
something, I can do it for you even if I don’t think it will be good for you. That 
can be an expression of my respect or friendship for you. . . . Another thing 
you can want for people you love is that they should be worthy of love and 
esteem. (69)
Adams offers a very illuminating discussion of friendship and the virtue 
of caring for common projects, e.g., being a good teammate or good col-
league. He stresses that friendship involves more than an altruistic desire 
for the good of the other person. It also requires that one desire and prize 
the relationship with the other person.
The third part of the book addresses recent work in psychology that, ac-
cording to many people, shows that the kinds of strong, causally-efficacious, 
enduring traits of character that constitute virtues and vices don’t exist. 
One well-known study of helping behavior is often cited in support of this 
view. The study observed subjects who emerged from a phone booth to 
witness someone (who was part of the research team) drop and scatter her 
papers on the floor in front of them. The study sought to determine which 
people would attempt to help the person who dropped her papers. A dime 
was planted in the phone booth before some of the subjects entered. Four-
teen of the sixteen people who found a dime stopped to help the stranger. 
Only one of twenty-five who didn’t find a dime in the phone booth stopped 
to help. This is a very striking result and shows that seemingly trivial dif-
ferences in situations can make a huge difference in people’s behavior.
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“Situationist” psychology holds that situational factors are generally 
a much more important factor in determining people’s behavior than 
their imputed fixed traits of character. In a famous study from the 1920s, 
Hartshorne and May sought to test honesty in school children. They mea-
sured the frequency of lying, cheating, and stealing and correlated them 
with other variables. 
The experimenters found that individual children were fairly consistent, or 
stable, over time in repeated tests of their honesty or dishonesty, in the same 
type of situation. But they also found, to their surprise, that individual re-
sults in different types of situations showed low correlations, and thus little 
cross-situational consistency. (116)
Assuming that the social science in question is sound, what are the im-
plications of these results for theories of virtue? Hurka concludes that vir-
tues construed as traits of character that involve deep-seated behavioral 
dispositions don’t exist and that we should alter our concepts of virtues 
and vices and apply them primarily to actions, occurrent attitudes, and 
mental states in particular situations. A very different response (made by 
Rachana Kamtekar in “Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of 
Our Character,” Ethics 114 [2004], 458–491) is to say that the classical con-
ception of virtue is untouched by research work in psychology—virtue is 
quite rare but still an ideal we should aspire to. Adams rejects both of these 
responses and argues that the evidence does not require that we abandon 
the idea that there are enduring traits of character that are central objects 
of our moral evaluation. However, he thinks that we need to acknowledge 
that virtues are frail and “modular.” With respect to the virtue of honesty, 
Adams notes that the English word “honesty” has a very broad meaning. 
Being honest involves possessing: 1) the disposition not to lie or deceive 
others, 2) the disposition not to cheat in rule-governed activities, and 3) 
the disposition not to steal from others. These are very disparate disposi-
tions and there is no reason to think that they are strongly correlated. The 
Hartshorne-May study would seem to show that it is very rare for people 
to be consistently honest in all these respects in a wide range of differ-
ent circumstances. But it also supports the view that narrower modules of 
these virtues (e.g., not cheating in sports, not cheating in one’s academic 
work, not lying to one’s spouse, not lying to one’s clients, and not stealing 
from one’s employer) are common and reasonably robust in determining 
our behavior. Adams thinks that this empirical evidence weighs strongly 
against Plato’s view about the unity of virtues according to which, in order 
to have any of the virtues, one must have all of them.
Adams does other things to try to defuse situationist psychology’s chal-
lenge to traditional views of the virtues. He stresses that virtues are not 
simply dispositions to act in certain ways. In the case of experiments that 
test helping behavior, he argues that the duties to help others are imper-
fect duties which allow people wide latitude in acting to fulfill them. Each 
of us has an obligation to help others, but no one has an obligation to help 
352 Faith and Philosophy
on every occasion, so not every case of failing to help observed in these 
experiments is contrary to virtue.
Adams claims that there is a great deal of moral luck in the develop-
ment of any person’s character so that virtue is to a very large measure a 
gift, rather than an individual achievement; nonetheless, virtue is excel-
lent and admirable.
This is an outstanding book, one of the very best books ever written on 
this most important topic. It is required reading for anyone interested in the 
virtues or ethical theory. Adams’s many examples are very apt and help-
ful; some of his observations about them are gems—marvels of insight and 
good sense. Adams’s book is also very clear and lucid, unusually clear and 
accessible for such an important contribution to philosophy. This makes it 
very suitable for use in upper division undergraduate courses. This book 
deserves a wide readership by philosophers and students of philosophy. 
The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Sceptical Religion, by J. L. Schellenberg. 
Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2009.
AKU VISALA, Oxford University
The Will to Imagine (henceforth Will) is the latest installment in J. L. 
Schellenberg’s trilogy on philosophy of religion. In the two previous 
books, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion (2005) and The Wisdom to 
Doubt: A Justification of Religious Scepticism (2007), Schellenberg strongly 
criticised most classical and contemporary arguments for belief in God. In 
philosophy of religion circles, Schellenberg is probably best known for his 
earlier work Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993), in which he pres-
ents his famous argument against theism from the hiddenness of God. 
The argument from hiddenness has since created a great deal of debate 
and Schellenberg himself has defended it in several different forums. The 
reader of these books and his other works might easily get the impression 
that Schellenberg seeks to abandon all possible forms of religion and ad-
vocate some form of naturalism. But this, as Will shows, is far from being 
the case.
The book is basically what the title says it is: an attempt to defend a cer-
tain kind of religious attitude—an attitude that is neither belief in some 
sort of God nor belief in the non-existence of God or gods. Schellenberg 
has set out to formulate a third position between these two alternatives. 
This middle position, however, is not strictly speaking an agnostic one as 
one might first think but a religious one—a sceptical religious attitude. 
Instead of religious or non-religious belief, Schellenberg suggests that faith 
would be a more proper attitude. The proper object of faith is what he 
calls ultimism. Ultimism is what 
